Good Morals Are Not a Legal Title: Ownership Cannot Be Established on Moral Grounds Alone
The judgment of the Supreme Court of the Slovak Republic, file no. 4Cdo/111/2024 of 21.08.2025, addresses whether ownership of real estate may be granted without a statutory legal title where, in the circumstances of the particular case, such an outcome appears equitable with reference to good morals. The dispute arose after the claimants had donated real estate to the defendant’s legal predecessor, who acquired it under a donation agreement from 1992. Following her death, the defendant acquired the real estate as her heir in inheritance proceedings.
The claimants sought a declaration of ownership of the real estate in the co-ownership shares they had held before the donation. Their argument was based mainly on the defendant’s negative conduct, the alleged intention of the defendant’s legal predecessor to return the real estate, and the principle of good morals. The District Court Trebišov dismissed the action by judgment of 15.02.2023, file no. 13C/8/2022-93, and the Regional Court in Košice confirmed that decision by judgment of 12.09.2023, file no. 6Co/82/2023. Both courts proceeded from the conclusion that the claimants had not established any legal title on the basis of which ownership could be restored to them.
The Supreme Court of the Slovak Republic confirmed that ownership is one of the fundamental and absolute property rights enjoying special constitutional protection under Article 20 of the Constitution of the Slovak Republic. Its acquisition is governed by mandatory rules. Under § 132(1) of Act No. 40/1964 Coll., the Civil Code, ownership may be acquired by purchase, donation or another contract, by inheritance, by decision of a state authority, or on the basis of other facts provided for by law. This provision expresses the principle of a closed list of modes of acquiring ownership. Courts therefore cannot create new, statutorily unrecognised modes of acquiring ownership merely because a particular factual situation gives rise to moral or equitable considerations.
The key conclusion of the judgment is that good morals under § 3(1) of Act No. 40/1964 Coll., the Civil Code, operate as a corrective mechanism in the exercise of already existing rights and obligations, not as an independent legal title for the creation of ownership. Good morals may, for example, justify denying legal protection to an exercise of a right that is formally compliant with the law but materially contrary to generally accepted moral principles. However, they cannot by themselves establish a new right in rem, alter existing ownership relations, or replace a missing legal act aimed at transferring the donated property back.
The Supreme Court of the Slovak Republic also addressed the claimants’ reliance on the finding of the Constitutional Court of the Slovak Republic, file no. III. ÚS 44/2011. It emphasised that that finding concerned the provision of substitute housing in proceedings for vacating real estate, and therefore the consequences of exercising an already existing ownership right, not the creation of ownership without a statutory legal title. It cannot therefore be inferred from that finding that good morals may serve as an autonomous title for acquiring ownership of real estate.
The practical significance of the judgment lies in confirming the limits of the corrective function of good morals in private law. The conduct of the heir of the donee, even if problematic, does not give rise to an obligation to return a gift under § 630 of Act No. 40/1964 Coll., the Civil Code, since the defendant was not the donee but the heir of the original donee. Likewise, the corrective principle of good morals under § 3(1) of Act No. 40/1964 Coll., the Civil Code, cannot serve as a normative basis for the creation of ownership. The Supreme Court of the Slovak Republic therefore dismissed the claimants’ appeal on points of law pursuant to § 448 of Act No. 160/2015 Coll., the Civil Dispute Procedure Code, as amended.
