ARTICLES & NEWS [#101]

WEARING RELIGIOUS SYMBOLS IN THE WORKPLACE: THE PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION CAN DECIDE TO PROHIBIT THE WEARING OF SUCH SYMBOLS BY ALL ITS EMPLOYEES

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#101Wearing religious symbols in the workplace: the public administration can decide to prohibit the wearing of such symbols by all its employees

Wearing religious symbols in the workplace: public administration may decide to ban the wearing of such symbols for all its employees according to the judgment of the Court of Justice in case C-148/22. In the interest of creating a completely neutral administrative environment, public administration may prohibit the visible wearing of any symbols revealing philosophical or religious beliefs in the workplace. Such a rule is not discriminatory if applied in a general and undifferentiated manner to all employees of this administration and is limited to the necessary minimum.

An employee of the municipality of Ans (Belgium), who performs her function as head of a department practically without contact with users of public services, was prohibited from wearing a Muslim headscarf in the workplace. Following this ban, the municipality amended its internal regulations and now requires strict neutrality from its employees: any form of proselytism and the wearing of any noticeable symbols of ideological or philosophical affiliation are prohibited for all employees, including those who do not interact with the public. The affected person claims that her freedom of religious belief has been violated, and that she is a victim of discrimination.

The Labor Court of Liège, which is hearing the case, wonders whether the strict neutrality rule established by the municipality leads to discrimination in violation of European Union law. The Court of Justice responds that a policy of strict neutrality imposed by public administration on its employees to create a completely neutral administrative environment can be considered objectively justified by a legitimate goal. Similarly, the choice of another public administration in favor of a policy allowing the general and undifferentiated wearing of visible symbols of conviction, especially philosophical or religious, or the prohibition of wearing such symbols limited to situations requiring such contacts, is also justified.

Indeed, each Member State, as well as subnational territorial entities within their competencies, has the discretion to conceive the neutrality of public service it intends to enforce in the workplace, depending on its own context. However, this goal must be pursued in a coherent and systematic manner, and measures taken to achieve it must be limited to the necessary minimum. It is the responsibility of national courts to verify compliance with these requirements.

The Court of Justice states that the legitimate goal of creating a completely neutral administrative environment can justify the prohibition of the visible wearing of any symbols revealing philosophical or religious convictions in the workplace. In this case, the legitimate goal of public administration is to achieve neutrality, minimizing the risk of discrimination and ensuring fair and equal treatment of all employees.

The Court emphasizes that the rule of strict neutrality is not discriminatory if applied universally and indifferently to all employees of public administration. This aims to prevent any hints of discrimination based on religious beliefs. Therefore, a legal commentary could assess the extent to which this decision is in line with the principle of equal treatment.

The Court recognizes that Member States have discretion in determining the policy of public service neutrality. A legal commentary could examine how this decision aligns with the principle of subsidiarity and the role that national courts should play in verifying compliance with neutrality requirements.

The Court emphasizes that measures taken to achieve the goal of neutrality should be limited to the necessary minimum. A legal commentary could address the question of whether the rule of strict neutrality is appropriately balanced and whether it excessively restricts the fundamental rights of employees.